in numerical form'. He finds that 'in general, democracies tend to have a greater desire for numbers and a greater motivation to make risks transparent than most other social systems'.
Gigerenzer laments that while it is generally agreed that the public has a right to information,'there is not yet a consensus that the public also has a right to get this information in a way that is clear and not misleading'. He strongly urges medical, legal and other associations to 'subscribe to an ethical policy that demands reporting risks in clear terms'.
In his well-acclaimed book, Gigerenzer particularly addresses two forms of statistical innumeracy: miscommunication of risk (a person knows the risks but does not know how to communicate these so that others understand them) and clouded thinking (a person knows the risks but not how to draw conclusions or inferences from them). He discusses three major forms of risk communication that invite miscommunication: the use of single-event probabilities (e.g. 'the risk of dying from this operation is 10%'), relative risks ('you are three times less likely to die if you had this operation than if you simply continued with your tablets') and conditional probabilities ('if you have this operation, you have a 90% chance of survival', which can be confused with '90% of survivors have had this operation').
The way in which risk is framed has an immense impact on risk perception, and Gigerenzer gives a dramatic illustration of this in relation to DNA testing. Say an accused person appears in court because his DNA matches a trace found at the scene of a crime. If an expert witness says 'the probability that this match has occurred by chance is 1 in 100,000', it is quite difficult to imagine that the crime was committed by anyone other than the accused. However, if the expert had phrased the same information differently -'Out of every 100,000 people, 1 will show a match' -then it can more easily be worked out that in a city of 1,000,000 inhabitants there would be 10 inhabitants whose DNA would match the index DNA.
Using such dramatic illustrations, Gigerenzer shows why probabilities, relative risk and percentages should be avoided in risk communication. Instead of these, we should use absolute risk and natural frequencies. A woman told that a particular treatment could double her risk of breast cancer (relative risk) will panic; she is reassured if told that the treatment increases the risk of breast cancer from 1 per 1000 to 2 per 1000 users (absolute risk). She gets a better perspective if the increased risk attributable to the treatment is stated as 1 per 1000 (frequency) rather than as 100% (percentage).
Recommendations on how best to communicate risk are also to be found in a variety of other sources. As the public generally find large numbers difficult to imagine, one such recommendation is that this information could be presented graphically: 'Illustrate a number like 1 million by Consent is a key issue in patient safety. For consent to be valid, the patient must understand the risks and benefits of the proposed intervention.This requires health professionals to be skilled in communicating risk; they should not only know the risks involved in the proposed intervention, but also be able to communicate these risks in a way that patients will understand. For interventions that carry unknown risk, or where little is known, this uncertainty should also be communicated to the patient. Unfortunately, training in risk communication is scarcely addressed in medical curricula at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. 1 Risk is commonly presented in numerical terms, but there is little in our training that specifically teaches us how to think with numbers and how to use numbers to quantify risk. We do not always distinguish between personal risk (e.g. the risk of having a baby with an autosomal recessive disorder is 1 in 4 if both parents are carriers for that disorder) and empiric risk (risk derived from population studies, e.g. 1 in 200 women undergoing amniocentesis will suffer a procedure-related miscarriage). We may fail to interpret numerical risk information in the appropriate context. For example, a biased picture would be obtained if we were to compare the procedure-related risk of miscarriage following amniocentesis performed at 17 weeks' gestation with that of chorionic villous biopsy performed at 11 weeks, without taking into account the background risk of miscarriage at the respective gestational ages. We may also fail to draw the right inferences from numerically-framed risk. Further, we are not always acutely aware of the factors that influence risk taking and risk aversion in relation to health behaviour, and find ourselves wondering why our patients indulge in what we perceive to be unnecessary risk-taking.
As a result of these shortcomings, we are not very good at communicating risk to our patients and equipping them with the understanding required for making decisions about treatment and health behaviour. To compound the problem, our patients themselves also have problems with numeracy -which makes it even more important for health professionals to have the right skills for communicating risk.
Health professionals and patients need help in this regard and one of the most illuminating works is Gerd Gigerenzer's book, Reckoning with Risk. 2 Gigerenzer observes that 'some cultures have an insatiable appetite for numbers -batting averages, SAT scores, and market indices -while others are more reluctant to express uncertainties 07.edozien.01.pps 2/19/07 10:49 AM Page 1 talking about the population of Glasgow. Rather than 1 in 1200, talk about 1 child in a large secondary school'. 3 Another reason for avoiding percentages, particularly when the sample size is small, is the 'Judas Effect':'although a massive 8% of Jesus' disciples betrayed him, this was actually just a single person. A 26% rise in breast cancer may sound alarming, but it actually means a difference of less than one case in each 1000 women per year'. 3 In this issue of Clinical Risk, two articles look at issues relating to risk communication. Earlam and colleagues 4 describe a study conducted in a London hospital to assess the degree of agreement amongst doctors on the numerical equivalent of words such as 'rarely', 'never', 'probable', 'possible' -words frequently (what does this mean in numbers?) used in consent discussions. They found extensive variation. This would ordinarily suggest that we should abandon the use of these words, but the authors say they should remain in use, serving as invaluable 'discourse openers'. Ortendahl 5 looks at the linguistic as well as numerical framing of risk, addressing some of the issues that Gigerenzer raised in his book but also looking at other ways in which risk framing can influence risk aversion or risk taking.
It is not only health professionals that have problems with risk communication. Politicians, journalists and admin-istrators have faced challenges in risk communication in diverse areas such as terrorism, bird flu pandemic, mad cow disease and mumps-measles-rubella vaccine.The courts have had to deal with major issues of risk communication in relation to cot death. In January this year, high winds wreaked havoc across the UK, killing a dozen people. Most lorry drivers continued trucking despite electronic signs on the motorways warning them to leave the road for their own safety. Could this be due to the way in which the risk was framed?
